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That Could Have Been Me: Director Deaths, CEO Mortality Salience, and Corporate 
Prosocial Behavior 
 
ABSTRACT 
Mortality salience – the awareness of the inevitability of death – is often traumatic. However, it can also be 
associated with a range of positive, self-transcendent cognitive responses, such as a greater desire to help 
others, contribute to society, and make a more meaningful contribution in one’s life and career. In this study, 
we provide evidence of a link between CEO mortality salience – triggered by the death of a director at the 
same firm – and a subsequent increase in firm-level prosocial behavior, or corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). We further show that this core relationship is amplified in situations where the death of the director 
is likely to have been especially salient (i.e., the director was appointed within the CEO’s tenure, or the 
death was sudden/expected). In supplementary analyses, we find suggestive evidence of increased CEO 
prosociality in other professional domains, as well as evidence that prosociality appears to be preferentially 
directed toward ingroups. 
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1. Introduction 
Leonard Woolf: Why does someone have to die? 
Virginia Woolf: Someone has to die in order that the rest of us should value life more 
           -The Hours 
 
Throughout history – across nations, cultures, times, and places – one of the most universal human 
experiences has been the process of coming to terms with mortality (Lester 1967, Greenberg et al. 1997, 
Yalom 2008, Gawande 2014). Art, philosophy, popular culture, and the media are replete with examples of 
humans grappling with the inevitable recognition that their time on Earth is all-too-finite (Choron 1963, 
Kübler-Ross 1969, Siebert 2013). Mortality salience – one’s “awareness of the inevitability of death” 
(Greenberg et al. 1997: 61) – represents a singularly powerful influence on human behavior (Pyszczynski 
et al. 1999; Grant and Wade-Benzoni 2009). 
 Although the experience is often psychologically traumatic (Kivimäki et al. 2002), heightened 
mortality salience has also been linked with a series of self-transcendent short-term and long-term cognitive 
responses. Individuals are more likely to engage in self-reflection, express the desire to better appreciate 
the time they have left, focus more on social relationships with family and friends, re-evaluate the nature 
and purpose of their careers, consciously search for greater personal meaning, and investigate ways of 
making a more lasting contribution to society (e.g., Schwartzberg and Janoff-Bulman 1994, Tedeschi and 
Calhoun 1995, Bonanno and Kaltman 2001, Grant and Wade-Benzoni 2009).  
 These responses to mortality cues echo findings from research across a range of academic disciplines 
that points to a fascinating general link between trauma and prosocial behavior, or “positive forms of social 
behavior” (Bar-Tal 1976; see also Bowles 2008, Bauer et al. 2014, Pierce et al. 2017). For instance, 
individuals in wartime exert more effort to reward cooperative behavior and punish non-cooperative 
behavior (Gneezy and Fessler, 2012), while individuals exposed to violence display more altruistic behavior 
toward their neighbors (Voors et al. 2012) and are more likely to engage in positive collective action such 
as voting and community organization (Gilligan et al. 2014). Close proximity to terrorism has similar effects. 
A recent study by Carnahan and colleagues (2017) found that the 9/11 terrorist attacks enhanced the 
meaningfulness of pro bono work for New York City lawyers (see also Levitt (2006) and Paruchuri and 
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Ingram (2012) for related arguments). Even the seemingly-innocuous experience of entering the workforce 
(Bianchi 2013) or adulthood (Bianchi 2014) during an economic recession has been linked with positive 
subsequent outcomes, such as lower levels of narcissistic behavior and higher career job satisfaction. Finally, 
lab studies reveal that experimentally-induced mortality salience increases participants’ contributions to 
charity and endorsement of self-transcendent values (Jonas et al. 2002, Joireman and Duell 2005).  
 Our study contributes to, and helps to integrate, this eclectic body of work by providing some of the 
very first evidence of a link between individual mortality salience and organizational prosocial behavior in 
the context of large, for-profit firms and their leaders. We synthesize arguments from several theoretical 
streams within and outside management to argue that CEOs experiencing the death of a role-relational peer 
(in this case, a director at the same firm) will respond in part by consciously and unconsciously re-evaluating 
their priorities, resulting in greater prosocial behavior. The death of a peer or colleague can be expected to 
trigger mortality salience because people tend to innately categorize such individuals as being similar to 
themselves (Cooper and Thatcher 2010). Categorization processes and assessments of similarity are basic 
to human cognition (Rips et al. 2012), with sameness having been identified as “the very keel and backbone 
of our thinking” (James 1890: 459). Individuals use similarity as a core organizing principle, and tend to 
assume, with good reason, that similar objects will behave similarly (Tversky 1977, Goldstone and Son 
2012). Those occupying similar roles tend to have similar expectations, interpret uncertain environmental 
stimuli in terms of similar cognitive schemas, and often hold relatively similar worldviews (Biddle 1986, 
Ebaugh 1988). Therefore, the death of a perceivedly-similar individual is especially salient because it 
reinforces the distressing insight that “it could have been me.” In turn, we predict that experiencing the 
death of a director at the same firm will increase the likelihood that a CEO will direct the firm’s 
discretionary resources toward greater levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Aguinis, 2011). 
  Building on this core relationship and our underlying theoretical logic, we also predict, and find 
evidence, that the impact of director deaths on CSR will be amplified in two situations where the death is 
likely to be especially salient for CEOs: 1) when the deceased director had been appointed after the CEO 
had taken office, which suggests a closer connection between the CEO and director; and 2) when the 
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director’s death was sudden and immediate with little advance warning, which suggests a more acute shock 
arising from the death event. Examining the moderating impact of death suddenness also helps us to have 
greater confidence in our causal claims regarding the impact of director deaths on CSR. Sometimes, when 
a senior corporate leader passes away while in office, there may have been some initial indication that such 
an event might eventually occur, whether due to longer-term concerns with overall wellbeing, periodic 
recurring bouts of illness, or a sharp but non-fatal decline in health status more recently (e.g., Nguyen & 
Nielson, 2010; Shi et al., 2017). In each of these circumstances, the death event itself is still likely to have 
a substantial impact, as we see in recent research (Quigley et al. 2017); however, the contemporaneous 
effect may be more muted or diffuse, and the very act of staying in office until death may at times influence 
director, CEO, and/or firm behavior in endogenous ways. Incorporating the moderating impact of death 
suddenness in our models helps us to address this potential concern, while still allowing us to use as large 
a sample of director deaths as possible, especially in light of the stringent matching process we employ. 
Finally, we provide several additional tests of our theoretical logic via supplementary analyses assessing 
the impact of director deaths on CEO behavior in other personal and professional domains (CSR on outside 
boards, non-profit board membership), and the extent to which prosociality is directed toward ingroups 
versus outgroups. 
 This study makes several additional broader contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to 
strategic leadership research on executive experiences (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). This work examines 
how executives’ past experiences differentially influence the ways in which they interpret and evaluate 
uncertain strategic situations, thus shaping their strategic choices and influencing firms’ unique courses of 
action (Carpenter et al. 2004, Finkelstein et al. 2009: 83-120). For instance, prior studies have linked CEO 
functional background and firm R&D spending (Barker and Mueller 2002), executive education levels and 
corporate strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel 1992), and top management team tenure and firm-level 
strategic persistence (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). One of the ongoing challenges with evaluating the 
impact of executives’ experiences, though, is the question of how much those experiences are themselves 
shaped by executives’ underlying dispositions, values, and preferences. To put it another way, does travel 
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broaden the mind, or are those with broader minds simply more likely to travel? Our study addresses this 
challenge by examining the impact on executives of a meaningful life experience that is neither chosen by 
CEOs, nor often expected in the first place.  
Second, we contribute to research into the study of death and dying by showing how the death of a 
peer can have substantial indirect effects, even at the level of an entire organization. Some existing work 
does consider the direct effects of individual deaths within organizational settings. For instance, the death 
of a ‘superstar’ scientist leads to a subsequent decline in collaborator publication quality, largely due to the 
direct loss of human capital in the collaborative network (Azoulay et al. 2010, Oettl 2012). Relatedly, the 
death of a senior executive has a direct (and increasing) impact on the perceived value of a corporation 
(Johnson et al. 1985, Quigley et al. 2017). However, little work has examined the indirect socio-cognitive 
effects of peer deaths within the context of senior corporate executives (see Shi et al. (2017) for a recent 
exception). In summary, our work makes a novel conceptual and empirical contribution to the management 
literature. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 CEO Mortality Salience, Death Reflection, and Organizational Prosocial Behavior 
Thanatology – the study of death, dying, and bereavement – is a complex, multidisciplinary field, and a 
broad and deep literature addresses the question of how people respond to, and cope with, traumatic events 
such as the death of a close friend, relative, or colleague (Greenberg et al. 1997, Grant and Wade-Benzoni 
2009, Meagher and Balk 2013, Dore et al. 2015). Although the experience of categorical stages of grief 
(e.g., Kuebler-Ross 1969) differs from person to person and varies in the degree to which they are linear, 
orderly, and exhaustive, prior work has linked mortality salience with two broad types of responses: death 
anxiety and death reflection (Grant and Wade-Benzoni 2009).  
 First, especially in the early stages of grief, bereaved individuals often initially experience some 
degree of death anxiety, resulting in withdrawal behaviors. This is sometimes termed “common grief,” and 
includes symptoms such as cognitive disorganization, dysphoria, health deficits, and disrupted social and 
occupational functioning (Bonanno and Kaltman 2001, Burton et al. 2006, Siflinger 2017). Death anxiety 
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is associated with stress, strain, and emotional exhaustion, resulting in self-protective withdrawal behaviors 
and behavioral disengagement at work (Kivimäki et al. 2002). CEOs experiencing death anxiety may, at 
least in the short-term, be less fully engaged in company business, perhaps seeking more of a ‘quiet life’ 
(cf. Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003, Koetter et al. 2012). Recent evidence shows that CEOs experiencing 
increased anxiety respond by withdrawing and pursuing lower-risk strategies (Mannor et al. 2016). For 
example, Shi and colleagues (2017) found that firms led by CEOs experiencing heightened mortality 
salience became less acquisitive. 
 A second, but more gradual and long-term, outcome of bereavement is death reflection, resulting in 
generative, prosocial behavior (Grant and Wade-Benzoni 2009). A stream of work in thanatology examines 
the phenomenon of posttraumatic growth – the experience whereby trauma, tragedy, and suffering 
substantively changes one’s priorities and behavior (Tedeschi and Calhoun 1995, Rendon 2015). This 
general idea, in varying forms, has appeared in religious and philosophical thinking throughout the ages. 
For instance, the Christian Bible notes: “we rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces 
endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope” (Romans 5:3-5). More recently, 
scholars have examined this fundamental link between trauma and personal growth across contexts as 
varied as war-torn societies (e.g., Gneezy and Fessler 2012), post-conflict societies (e.g., Voors et al. 2012, 
Callen et al. 2014), terrorist attacks (e.g., Levitt 2006, Paruchuri and Ingram 2012), mass shootings (Dore 
et al. 2015, Pierce et al. 2017), and societal economic downturns (Bianchi 2013, 2014). 
 Posttraumatic growth appears to be driven by two distinct mechanisms. First, growth can occur 
indirectly from the effects of coping with psychological distress (Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004). Trauma 
challenges and undermines individuals’ higher-order schemas – such as those relating to people getting 
what they deserve, the behavioral bases of events, and assumptions concerning the impact of random 
circumstances. For instance, research into the “sadder-but-wiser” phenomenon has shown that sadness 
makes people more likely to engage in careful, deliberative, conscious (“System 2”) thought (Kahneman 
2011, Lerner et al. 2013), and lessens the impact of a number of innate cognitive biases, such as 
overconfidence and overoptimism (Alloy and Abramson 1979). 
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 Second, growth can arise directly as a result of consciously re-evaluating one’s own life in light of a 
particular trauma, including a search for existential meaning (Kashdan and Kane 2011, Meyersburg and 
McNally 2011). Individuals experiencing trauma are more likely to lose their sense of invulnerability, 
recognize the inevitability of death, and thereby change their priorities (Tedeschi and Calhoun 1995), 
sometimes even going so far as to report a changed philosophy of life (Joseph et al. 1993). Bereavement 
can thus act as a concrete trigger for an individual to reevaluate their own life, especially when the 
characteristics or circumstances of the deceased make the death highly salient to the individual.  
  Individuals engaging in death reflection often respond by seeking out opportunities to assist, mentor, 
and meaningfully connect with others, resulting in prosocial behavior. Although, as noted above, CEOs 
experiencing heightened mortality salience from the death of a director may initially respond by 
deprioritizing their work, it is unlikely that these types of successful, motivated, career-oriented individuals 
– whose personal identities are often closely linked to their corporate roles (Wrzesniewski et al. 1997) – 
will withdraw completely. Instead, we argue that they are likely to shift their focus toward different types 
of behaviors. Individuals who experience a heightened awareness of their own mortality often report a 
desire to improve the lives of other people and make an impact that outlives the individual themselves (e.g., 
Kotre 1984, Tedeschi and Calhoun 1995).  
 In particular, mortality cues appear to amplify a general trend in individuals toward increased death 
awareness over time, and especially in midlife. Death awareness makes individuals more likely to initiate 
lasting contributions and pursue connections with others (McAdams and de St. Aubin 1992, Grant and 
Wade-Benzoni 2009). For example, the link between mortality salience and self-transcendent values (cf. 
Jonas et al. 2002) is stronger for proselfs (individuals who originally valued their own well-being more 
strongly vis-à-vis the well-being of others) (Joireman and Duell 2005). Prosocial behaviors help individuals 
cope with mortality salience by buffering the perceived impact of death (Greenberg et al. 1997). Behaviors 
driven by prosocial motivation – the desire to help others, deepen personal relationships, and make a larger 
contribution to society – attenuate the fear of death because they make it easier for individuals to envision 
an ongoing influence beyond their own death (Peterson and Stewart 1996). Thus, we expect that CEOs 
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experiencing peer deaths will display different priorities regarding time and resource allocation in their 
professional lives, and will be more likely to support and initiate activities consistent with the desire to help 
or make a positive difference for others and to promote others’ welfare (Grant and Wade-Benzoni 2009).  
 Strategic leadership research is driven by the premise that “strategy is a human construction” 
(Andrews, 1971: 107), and that organizations are reflections of their top managers (Finkelstein et al. 2009). 
Variations among corporate leaders in terms of their fields of vision, perceptions, and interpretations of 
ambiguous situations – driven by underlying differences in dispositions, cognitions, ideologies, and other 
idiosyncratic experiences – result in commensurate differences in corporate behavior (Hambrick and Mason 
1984, Wang et al. 2016). Thus, we predict that a CEO’s increased focus on prosocial behavior will be 
reflected in different firm-level priorities regarding corporate resource allocation, and a change in personal 
priorities should be reflected in changes in organizational decisions and choices.  
 Within organizations, an increase in CEO prosocial motivation is most likely to be clearly revealed 
by an increase in activity related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR can be defined as “context-
specific organizational actions and policies that take into account stakeholders’ expectations and the triple 
bottom line of economic, social, and environmental performance” (Aguinis 2011: 855). Although the 
sources of CSR are multi-faceted and occur across multiple levels of analysis (e.g., institutional, 
organizational), research points to the central role of managers and senior executives in initiating, 
supporting, modifying, and abolishing particular CSR initiatives (see Aguinis and Glavas (2012) for a 
review). CSR has been shown to be influenced by CEO personality characteristics (Petrenko et al. 2016) 
and experiences (Galaskiewicz 1997). For example, CEO other-regarding values are positively related to 
stakeholder salience for non-shareholders (Agle et al. 1999). CEOs with a heightened level of mortality 
salience are likely to influence firm-level resource allocation toward activities that provide tangible benefits 
to non-shareholding stakeholders – such as improved employee health plans, more environmentally-
friendly manufacturing processes, and charitable contributions – and away from activities that may prove 
more harmful to stakeholders – such as limiting corporate disclosures, persisting with family-unfriendly 
employment schedules, and polluting the environment. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 1: The death of a company director will be associated with an increase in the firm’s 
level of corporate social responsibility 
 
2.2 Amplification of Mortality Salience  
Our core theoretical logic is based on the premise that the impact of director deaths on firm-level CSR will 
be driven by CEOs’ heightened mortality salience, in part by perceptions of similarity with the director, 
such as having occupied broadly similar roles, having worked in similar domains, and having viewed the 
world in a similar way. In the same way that a greater cognizance of death is associated with an increased 
likelihood of purchasing life insurance (Browne and Kim 1993), relational identification with a deceased 
peer is likely to make a CEO question their own personal mortality (Sluss and Ashforth 2007). If this logic 
is correct, we expect to find that the core main effect predicted in Hypothesis 1 will be stronger in situations 
where the director death is likely to be especially salient to the CEO. We consider two such situations. 
First, we predict that the impact of a director death will be amplified when the CEO feels a stronger 
relational connection with the deceased director, which will enhance role identification and subsequent 
mortality salience. A widely-studied example of professional closeness in the upper echelons of 
organizations is whether or not a director was initially appointed during the tenure of the CEO (e.g., 
Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, Hwang and Kim 2009, Fracassi and Tate 2012, Park 2018). Although recent 
legislative changes have increased the expectations of director independence, most scholars tend to assume 
that CEOs continue to be partly or heavily responsible for the appointment of new directors during their 
tenures (Hwang and Kim 2009). CEOs prefer to appoint directors with which they have greater social 
connections outside the organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012), and a director hired within the CEO’s tenure 
is more likely to be seen as being part of the CEO’s own cohort, enhancing the perceived relational 
connection between the two.  
Research in finance and accounting often treats directors appointed by a CEO as being more likely 
to permit CEO entrenchment and private benefits (Bebchuk and Fried 2003, Park 2018), reasoning that a 
director’s dependence on the CEO creates greater difficulties in monitoring. At the heart of this argument 
is the assumption that such CEO-director social ties make it more challenging for directors to dismiss or 
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sanction a CEO if required. Another important implication of this argument, though, is the cognitive impact 
such a relationship is likely to have on the CEO, which will be driven by social categorization processes 
(Farh et al. 1998). Individuals subconsciously categorize themselves and others in terms of salient 
characteristics. These diagnostic features have a disproportionate influence on judgments of similarity 
(Tversky 1977). CEOs are therefore likely to focus on categorical characteristics of the deceased peer (e.g., 
being a member of the same corporate cohort), and underplay characteristics that may be arguably more 
influential in leading to the death (such as weight, health, and exercise habits). And, because this process 
operates via self-categorization, there is no necessary requirement for CEOs to have been personal friends 
with the deceased directors (although professional closeness may also be associated with stronger friendship 
ties (Thomas 1990)). Thus, in situations where a deceased director had been appointed within the tenure of 
a CEO, the director death is likely to be more salient, amplifying CEOs’ death reflection and subsequent 
preference for prosocial behavior. In contrast, in situations where a deceased director had been hired prior 
to the CEO’s arrival at the firm, CEOs are relatively less likely to see the director as being reflective of an 
important relational connection, resulting in fewer changes in prosocial behavior. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Director appointment within the CEO’s tenure will positively moderate the 
relationship between director deaths and corporate social responsibility 
 Second, we predict that the impact of a director death will be amplified when the death event was 
unexpected, such as via a sudden heart attack, stroke, or accident. Healthy executives are more likely to 
identify with their peers who show no obvious signs of illness or infirmity, compared with those who have 
deteriorated in health over a long period of time. Whether or not executives share general negative societal 
attitudes toward disability (e.g., Chan et al. 2005), healthy executives are likely to see sick or injured 
directors as being categorically dissimilar to themselves. Further, the psychological impact of bereavement, 
and trauma more generally, tends to be stronger when the event was unexpected (Lehrman 1956, Siflinger 
2017). Individuals facing such situations have no opportunity to prepare themselves or engage in 
“anticipatory grief” (Lundin 1984), amplifying the effect of the event itself. Thus, unexpected director 
  
11 
 
deaths will increase the likelihood of CEO death reflection and subsequent prosociality because: 1) CEOs 
are more likely to identify with seemingly-healthy peers, and 2) the immediacy of the deaths will make the 
events more psychologically salient, amplifying CEOs’ tendencies to reflect on their implications. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Director death suddenness will positively moderate the relationship between director 
deaths and corporate social responsibility 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Difference-in-differences Analysis with Coarsened Exact Matching 
We tested our hypotheses using a difference-in-differences (DID) analytical model (Donald and Lang 2007), 
where we treated director deaths as having created a quasi-randomly-assigned “treatment” group (firms 
where death occurs) and control group (firms where no death occurs). We estimated the following 
difference-in-differences specification: 
  CSRit = β0,it + β1,itPost-deatht × Death Groupi + β,2itPost-deatht +γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit                    (1) 
where i and t index firms and time, respectively. CSR represents firm-level corporate social responsibility, 
and X represents a vector of control variables. FirmFE denotes firm fixed effects, which are included to 
control for cross-sectional differences in dependent variables across firms. Similarly, YearFE denotes year 
fixed effects, which are included to account for systematic temporal effects. Post-death was measured as a 
binary 1/0 (dummy) variable, coded as one in firm-years following the death of a director and coded as 0 
otherwise. Death group was measured as a binary 1/0 dummy, coded as one if there was a death event in a 
firm. The β1 coefficient in Eq. (1) captures the “treatment effect on the treated” (Angrist and Pischke 2008), 
and provides an estimate of the effect of director deaths on CSR. Note that the main effects of Death group 
are absorbed by the firm fixed effects. Standard errors were clustered at the firm level.  
 To create our initial death events sample, we manually searched S&P Executive Register, Factiva, 
Edgar 8-K filings, and Google using keywords related to director (e.g., “director,” “board”) and death (e.g., 
“passed away,” “deceased,” etc.) over the period 1990 to 2013. This screen identified a total of 755 death 
events. We then restricted our sample to only those director deaths that occurred at public firms, and 
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excluded all firms where we were unable to gather full data on CEO, director, and governance 
characteristics (from BoardEx, Edgar, and CapitalIQ), financial metrics (from Compustat), and CSR scores 
(from KLD). This reduced our preliminary sample to 330 death events during the 1999-2013 time period.  
Inferences from difference-in-differences specifications rely in part on a parallel trend assumption, 
i.e., absent the treatment, both treated and control firms would have continued to exhibit similar trends in 
the outcomes of interest. Although we think it is unlikely that the CEOs in our sample changed their 
behavior in anticipation of director deaths, we used 1:1 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) without 
replacement to select firms for comparison that were as similar as possible at the time of treatment. We also 
included several covariate controls to adjust for potential differences in trends over time.  
 CEM uses Monotonic Imbalance Bounding (MIB) multivariate matching, which reduces causal 
estimation error, model-dependence, bias, and inefficiency (Iacus et al. 2011). To create the CEM sample, 
we took the sample of treatment firms that had experienced director deaths, and then identified matching 
(control) firms for each treatment firm. Choosing a set of matching criteria involves an inherent trade-off 
between the stringency of the match and the fraction of the sample for which a match can be found (Singh 
and Agrawal 2011). If too many treated units are discarded as a result of stringent matching criteria, the 
inferences from CEM may be inefficient. However, stringency in matching is crucial because inferences 
from matching-based estimates rely upon the “selection on observables” assumption (Heckman and 
Navarro-Lozano 2004; Bode et al. 2015). Often, the likelihood of ‘treatment’ occurring might also depend 
on unobservable and/or unmeasurable characteristics. However, improving the quality of observable 
matching variables can largely reduce – though not completely eliminate – concerns about the effect of 
unobservable factors on endogeneity issues, as unobservables are usually correlated with observables 
(Altonji et al. 2005). Thus a more comprehensive and theoretically cogent vector of matching variables can 
help to improve the quality of causal inferences. Specifically, for each treated firm, we used one-to-one 
matching based on the pre-treatment board size, average director age, CEO age, firm size, and accounting 
performance (ROA), as these covariates may both affect the likelihood of observing director death and are 
fundamental board/CEO/firm characteristics that have been used as CEM matching criteria (e.g., Younge 
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et al. 2015). We also imposed the restriction that our pool of control firms (before CEM matching) could 
not experience any director deaths during the sample period. We then created a matched sample in the year 
immediately before each death event using CEM 1:1 matching without replacement, with the optimal level 
of coarsening determined by Sturges’ Rule (Blackwell et al. 2010).  
 Using this Coarsened Exact Matching procedure, we were able to find a valid matched pair for 104 
firms experiencing death events. We further required a balanced panel, with each treatment group firm and 
control group firm having at least one, and up to four, firm-year observations both before and after the death 
year. We chose to use a sample of four years post-death in order to allow sufficient time for the phenomena 
in our study to unfold. For instance, although we believe a director death will act as a mortality cue quite 
quickly, it may take longer (one or more years) to enact some of the organizational changes triggered by 
this cue. We required both treatment and control firms to have same number of firm-year observations. This 
screen resulted in the exclusion of 15 additional cases. Our final sample therefore comprised 89 director 
death events and 1,254 firm-years (627 firm-years for each of the treatment and control groups).  
 We used multiple tests to gauge the quality of matching. Panel A of Table 1 reports univariate and 
multivariate L1 imbalance statistics for our sample before and after CEM matching. Imbalance is a measure 
of how covariates differ between the treatment and control groups. In the CEM algorithm, imbalance is 
measured by the L1 statistic—a summary measure of global imbalance calculated by comparing the 
differences between all the covariates at once (Iacus et al. 2011). The L1 statistic can range from 0 to 1, 
with higher values representing less balance between the treatment and control groups. When perfect 
balance between treatment and control groups is achieved, L1 is equal to zero. When there is perfect 
imbalance, L1 is equal to 1. Thus, our objective in matching is to make the L1 statistic smaller (i.e., make 
the groups more similar to one another and therefore the comparisons more valid). Panel A of Table 1 shows 
that both univariate and multivariate L1 statistics declined significantly after CEM matching. Similarly, 
Panel B of Table 1 reports univariate comparisons of differences in means between treatment and control 
firms. These data reveal no significant differences in means between the two samples. In supplementary 
analyses (discussed below), we demonstrate that our results are robust to the use of alternative matching 
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methods and criteria, including the use of less stringent matching criteria resulting in larger matched 
samples with more director death events.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Of the 89 death events in our final sample, 12 (13.5%) were coded as sudden deaths, based on an 
assessment of the circumstances surrounding each death taken from relevant news articles, obituaries, and 
company reports. Following Nguyen and Nielsen (2010: 553), a death was characterized as being sudden 
if it was unexpected and occurred “instantaneously or within a few hours of an abrupt change in the person’s 
previous clinical state.” The causes of sudden death were: acute illness (42%), heart attack (25%), stroke, 
and accidents (8%). This overall incidence of sudden deaths as a proportion of total deaths is below, but 
generally in line with, comparable figures from recent studies (e.g., Shi and colleagues (2017) report an 
incidence of 24%). The overall incidence of sudden deaths is also likely to be relatively low because the 
role of an independent director will tend to be less onerous than that of an executive director or CEO, so 
occupants may be less likely to resign due to illness or infirmity, thus decreasing the proportion of deaths 
categorized as sudden.  
 Although recent work suggests that all director deaths are likely to have a meaningful effect on the 
phenomena we consider in this study (e.g., Quigley et al. 2017), sudden deaths provide the cleanest possible 
causal test of our logic because there is less likelihood of an anticipatory response. However, our 
conservative sampling and estimation approach, including the use of 1:1 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
without replacement (described below), substantially reduces our statistical power if we were to only 
consider sudden deaths. Further, the proportion of deaths categorized as truly sudden or unexpected is likely 
to have decreased steadily over time in response to general societal improvements in both preventive and 
curative medical treatment (e.g., Niemeijer et al. 2015, Steg and Ducrocq 2016), potentially making the 
distinction between sudden and non-sudden deaths somewhat less helpful. We address this challenge 
through the use of death suddenness as a moderator, which allows us to test our core theoretical mechanism 
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of mortality salience caused by director death while also taking advantage of a larger sample of meaningful 
non-sudden deaths. 
3.2 Dependent Variables  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) was operationalized as an aggregate measure, comprised of six 
dimensions from the KLD Social Ratings database: community relations, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product quality. These dimensions have been widely used in prior CSR 
research, and appear to be of most interest to stakeholders (e.g., Wang and Choi 2013). Within each 
dimension are a number of individual items relating to CSR strengths and concerns. We used only the CSR 
strengths for each dimension, in line with findings from prior work (e.g. Mattingly and Berman 2006, 
Kacperczyk 2009) showing that CSR strengths and CSR weaknesses in the KLD database lack convergent 
validity and should therefore not be combined as a net score. The overall CSR measure was therefore the 
sum of the CSR strengths scores for each of the six dimensions in a given firm-year.  
3.3 Moderator Variables 
We used two moderators to capture situations where we expected CEO mortality salience would be more 
acute following a director death. First, to reflect the relational connection between the CEO and the 
deceased director, we created a 1/0 binary variable (CEO appointee) that was coded as one if the deceased 
director had been appointed within the CEO’s tenure. For control firms, we coded this variable as zero. 
Second, to reflect the added impact of death immediacy, we created a sudden death 1/0 binary variable, 
which was operationalized as described above (Nguyen and Nielsen 2010).  
3.4 Control Variables  
We included the following firm-year-level controls in our models to improve the efficiency of our estimates. 
Firm age was measured as the natural log of the number of years that a firm had appeared in the Compustat 
database. Leverage was measured as long-term debt plus current debt, divided by total assets (e.g., Aghion 
et al. 2004). Diversification was measured as number of business segments. We also controlled for 
important governance conditions, including board independence (outside director ratio), CEO duality (a 
dummy variable indicating that the CEO also served as the board chair), and CEO tenure (in years).  
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 Finally, we included several control variables to account for the possibility that our results were 
instead being driven by a change in capabilities or talent at the board level following a director death. First, 
we controlled for CEO turnover (a dummy variable indicating that the firm experienced a CEO turnover 
event in year t). Next, we controlled for the proportion of directors leaving the firm (Director leave %) and 
the proportion of directors joining the firm (Director join %) to account for changes in board human capital.  
4. Results 
4.1. Main Effects 
Table 2 contains summary statistics and preliminary univariate comparisons. Panel A reports overall 
descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports pre-death and post-death levels of CSR and all 
control variables, broken down by treatment firms and control firms. This panel also reports p-values from 
t-tests of changes in CSR from the pre-death to the post-death period. As shown in Panel B, treatment firms 
exhibited significant increases in CSR following the death events, while control firms did not exhibit 
significant increases in CSR. The last two columns of Panel B report the results for our main difference-in-
differences test comparing changes in CSR for treatment firms relative to control firms; this difference was 
also significant (p = 0.011). Preliminary evidence from these univariate tests is thus consistent with our 
main hypothesis (H1) that the death of a company director is positively associated with a firm’s subsequent 
level of CSR. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Table 3 reports results from estimating Equation (1). Column (1) shows a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for Post-death*Death group in the absence of any controls (t-stat = 3.01). This 
specification mitigates “bad control” problems, whereby inclusion of controls that are determined 
contemporaneously with the dependent variables might bias the treatment coefficient dummy (Angrist and 
Pischke 2008). As shown, this specification provided support for H1. Figure 1 displays histograms for CSR 
for the treatment and control firms both before and after the death event. Both a Mann-Whitney test (p < 
0.001) and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution (p = 0.002) indicates that 
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CSR scores for the treatment group differed between pre-death and post-death periods. This figure also 
provides evidence that our results do not appear to be driven by outlier observations.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 Column (2) in Table 3 reports the full DID model controlling for time-varying firm characteristics. 
We continue to find a positive and significant association between director death and CSR activities. The 
estimated effect of death on CSR was 0.372 with a t-statistic of 3.16. This suggests that firms experiencing 
director deaths exhibited an average increase in CSR of 0.372 (or 57% relative to its mean) in the post-
death period relative to the control firms. Column (3) in Table 3 adds CEO fixed effects to control for any 
cross-sectional differences between managers that might otherwise confound our results. By including firm, 
year and CEO effects, this test estimates the relation between death and CSR activities using only variation 
within a given year, firm, or manager. The results show that our inference remained unchanged.  
 To mitigate the potential concern that the differences in CSR among treated and control firms might 
be driven by differences in industry trends or local business conditions, we re-estimated Eq. (1) after 
replacing year fixed effects with industry-year joint fixed effects. Industry-year fixed effects are constructed 
as a unique vector of year fixed effects for each two-digit SIC code. This specification controls for any 
time-varying industry shocks that might arise as a result of changes within an industry (e.g. changes in 
industry norms or attitude towards CSR activities) or secular industry trends. Results in Column (4) of Table 
3 show that we continued to find a positive relation between director death and CSR activities (β = 0.358, 
t-stat = 2.30). Next, to mitigate the concern that our results might be confounded by the characteristics of 
different strata of control firms, we replaced firm fixed effects with strata fixed effects. We further included 
Death group into this regression as the main effect is no longer absorbed by firm fixed effects. Column (5) 
of Table 3 shows that our results remained robust (β = 0.382, t-stat = 2.91). Lastly, we bootstrapped the 
standard errors by firm with 10,000 iterations. Column (6) of Table 3 shows that our results were robust (β 
= 0.372, t-stat = 5.72). See Section 4.3 below for more discussion of robustness tests and supplementary 
analyses. 
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 Column (5) in Table 3 also allows us to compare the effect size of director deaths on CSR with the 
effect sizes of other relevent firm-level influences. For instance, we see that highly-leveraged firms are less 
likely to engage in CSR, which is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Barnea and Rubin 2010). Leverage 
of one standard deviation above the mean was associated with a reduction in CSR of 0.150, or 23% relative 
to the CSR mean. This effect was slightly less than half the effect size of director deaths in our sample, as 
noted above. Alternatively, high diversification (one standard deviation above the mean) was associated 
with a reduction in CSR or 0.113, or 17%, while high CEO tenure (again one standard deviation above the 
mean) was associated with an increase in CSR of 0.225, or 35%. This latter effect was a little less than two-
thirds the effect of director deaths in our sample. 
4.2. Moderating Effects 
Our moderating hypotheses (H2 and H3) predicted that the impact of director deaths on CSR would be 
amplified in situations where one might expect CEOs’ identification with the deceased directors, and 
therefore mortality salience, to have been stronger. To test each of these hypotheses, we modified equation 
(1) to the following triple-difference specification: 
CSRit = β0,it + β1,itPost-deatht × Death Groupi ×Moderating Variablei+ β2,itPost-deatht × Death 
Groupi +β3,itPost-deatht  +γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit                    (2) 
Note that these models also included the main effect of the relevant moderator variable. Similar to Eq. (1), 
though, the main effects of moderating variables and Death group were absorbed by the firm fixed effects.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 Table 4 reports the results of our moderating hypotheses. Model 1 shows that CEO appointee (a 
binary measure of whether the deceased director had been appointed by the CEO) was a positive and 
significant moderator of the director death-CSR relationship (β = 1.008, t-stat = 2.79), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. Model 2 in Table 4 shows that sudden death was a positive and significant moderator of the 
director deaths-CSR relationship (β = 0.564, t-stat = 2.07), supporting Hypothesis 3. Overall, therefore, we 
found support for our moderating hypotheses (H2 and H3) and for the claim that the impact of director 
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deaths would be stronger in situations where CEOs could be expected to have identified more strongly with 
the deceased directors. 
4.3 Robustness Tests and Supplementary Analyses 
We conducted a range of additional tests to assess the sensitivity our primary inferences.  As noted above, 
inferences from DID analyses rely on the assumption that, absent the treatment effect, both treated and 
control firms would have changed the same. To assess whether this is plausible, we tested whether treated 
and control firms followed a parallel trend prior to the treatment (Ryan et al. In press). We first plotted the 
average value of CSR between treated and control firms from t-3 to t+3 where t=0 is the year where death 
occurred (see Figure 2). This figure includes whisker plots of 90% confidence intervals for the treated and 
control groups. We also report yearly mean differences between treated and control groups. Figure 2 
suggests that there were no meaningful differences in CSR between treated and control firms prior to the 
death, supporting the parallel trend assumption. Further, differences in CSR began to occur in the death 
event year, providing additional evidence that the behavior of treated firms was being influenced by the 
event. We also calculated a leads and lags model including binary indicators for each of the three years prior 
to death and each of the three years post-death. None of the pre-death coefficients were significant, 
providing additional support for our parallel trend assumption. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Second, we assessed the sensitivity of our results to the particular econometric techniques used.  We 
initially used OLS regression as the main estimation method to facilitate the interpretation of our interaction 
variables (Ai and Norton 2003). Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results after re-estimating Eq (1) using 
Poisson regression; our findings were robust to this choice1. Next, we assessed the sensitivity of our results 
to the particular matching technique used. We used CEM matching without replacement in the main analysis 
                                                 
1 We estimated the regression using Stata command xtpoisson. Since xtpoisson does not allow clustering of standard 
errors at the firm level, we report bootstrapped standard errors in column (1). 
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to mitigate the estimation bias that might be introduced by using the same control firms for different 
treatment groups. This more stringent matching requirement trades off sampling bias with estimation power. 
Column (2) of Table 5 displays results after conducting CEM 1:1 matching with replacement, while Column 
(3) displays results after employing an alternative CEM matching scheme that allows for one to multiple 
matching without replacement. In both cases, the revised matching technique resulted in a larger matched 
sample, and our results continued to hold in these two samples. We then examined whether our results were 
robust to the use of reasonable, but less stringent, alternative sets of CEM matching variables. To test this, 
we created a sample with matching based on only the three CEO- and firm-level variables (CEO age, firm 
size, accounting performance), but not the two board-level variables (director age, board size), which we 
instead included as controls. As expected, this resulted in a larger matched sample (223 death events and 
2810 firm-year observations), albeit one with less effective matching. Column (4) in Table 5 shows that our 
results also held in this alternative sample. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 We also assessed the sensitivity of our results to the level of coarsening (i.e. bin size) used in the 
CEM analysis. Our main analysis used Sturges’ rules to determine the optimal level of coarsening, and our 
univariate statistics showed significant improvement in imbalancing statistics (see Table 1). We were 
reluctant to manually re-coarsen because of a lack of theoretical guidance on how to coarsen the variables. 
A larger bin size (hence a smaller number of groups) will result in a smaller matched sample and the 
associated reduction in statistical power. Nonetheless, to provide a further conservative test, we re-ran our 
analyses after coarsening by creating quartile groups for each of the five matching variables; results 
remained qualitatively similar.  
   In line with much of the research in strategic leadership that draws on upper echelons theory (e.g., 
Hambrick and Mason 1984, Wang et al. 2016), we focus in this study on the theoretical link between CEO-
level characteristics and outcomes at the CEO’s own firm. However, if our assumption of an increased 
personal focus on prosocial behavior following the death of a director is correct, we expected to also find 
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corroborative evidence in behavioral domains linked with the individual outside the firm. We examined two 
such outcomes. 
 First, we expected that an increased desire to engage in prosocial behavior would be manifested in a 
CEO’s discretionary professional choices at other firms where the CEO served as a director (Carpenter and 
Westphal 2001). Although the influence of directors on company strategy is more indirect and less 
unequivocal compared to the influence of CEOs and other senior executives (Pugliese et al. 2016), directors 
nevertheless have the power to encourage, influence, modify, retard, and even abolish large-scale strategic 
initiatives based on their own personal preferences (Carpenter and Westphal 2001, Davis et al. 2003, 
Shropshire 2010). To test this, we created a measure of CSR outside, which was operationalized as the mean 
firm-year-level CSR score at firms where the CEO served as an outside director. Columns (1) and (3) in 
Table 6 report the results of these tests without, and with, control variables, respectively. As shown in 
Column (3), the post-death x death group interaction was a positive and significant predictor of CSR outside 
(β = 0.187, t-stat = 2.70).  
 Second, heightened prosocial behavior is likely to be manifested in discretionary personal choices 
such as an increased engagement with nonprofit organizations. CEOs can use external directorships on 
nonprofit boards as a form of personal philanthropy, to assist with fundraising and promote the mission of 
an organization, to symbolically signal their commitment to particular causes, and to provide more explicit 
guidance and mentorship (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 1994, O’Regan and Oster 2005, Teksten et al. 2005). 
To test this idea, we gathered data on Nonprofit boards, which was operationalized as the number of 
nonprofit board directorships (e.g., charities, schools, and religious organizations) associated with a 
particular CEO in a given year in the BoardEx database. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 6 report the results 
of these tests without, and with, control variables, respectively. As shown in Column (4), the post-death x 
death group interaction was a positive and significant predictor of CEO nonprofit board membership (β = 
0.067, t-stat = 2.61).2  
                                                 
2 Prior research has found that directors selectively disclose non-public directorships in company proxy statements 
and often withhold or manage voluntary information that appears in the public domain (Gow et al. 2016). Thus it is 
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------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
 Finally, we conducted an additional supplementary analysis to explore the question of whether CEOs’ 
prosocial behavior was being preferentially directed toward particular groups or individuals. Although 
considerable work finds a link between trauma and positive individual behavior (Gneezy and Fessler 2012, 
Voors et al. 2012, Carnahan et al. 2017), closer examination of this literature reveals that much of the 
increase in prosociality is directed toward one’s ingroup (cf. Hogg and Terry 2000). For example, exposure 
to war made people more egalitarian but only toward those from the same village (Bauer et al. 2014), while 
interethnic experiences modified the impact of violence on increased trustworthiness (Becchetti et al. 2014). 
In fact, a recent study by Pierce and colleagues (2017) that focused on individuals’ post-traumatic responses 
toward strangers (in this case, tipping at restaurants in close proximity to a recent mass shooting tragedy) 
reported a negative impact of trauma on prosociality. Taken together, these findings appear consistent with 
a preferential link between trauma and prosociality toward ingroups. If mortality salience does indeed 
become less existentially upsetting when individuals are able to envision an ongoing influence beyond their 
death (Peterson and Stewart 1996), it makes sense that this ongoing influence will be both more achievable 
and more meaningful in a concrete, proximal context (i.e., one’s ingroup) versus a diffuse, distal context 
(one’s outgroup).  
 We were able to investigate this idea using our sample, albeit in a somewhat rudimentary manner. 
We divided the six dimensions of CSR from the KLD database into three dimensions that appear to be more 
ingroup-focused (employee relations, diversity, product quality) and three dimensions that seem more 
outgroup-focused (community relations, human rights, and the environment). We then ran our original DID 
analysis separately using outgroup CSR and ingroup CSR as the dependent variables. As shown in Table 7, 
                                                 
possible that the number of nonprofit boards in our paper is underreported. To partly address this possibility, we 
constructed an alternative measure of nonprofit boards based on a count of all nonprofit boards that the CEO had 
served on up to that point in time (instead of the number of nonprofit directorships reported in a given CEO-year). 
Our results were not sensitive to this choice. Nonetheless, we recommend interpreting these supplementary results 
with some caution. 
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the interaction of post-death and death group was a significant predictor of ingroup CSR (β = 0.235, t-
stat=2.59) but not outgroup CSR (β = 0.074, t-stat=1.60). These coefficients were also significantly different 
according to the results of a seemingly unrelated estimation, or SUEST, test (Chi2 = 3.38, p = 0.066). For 
instance, the firm Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) experienced the death of a director in 2008. Data from KLD 
show that the firm’s CSR strengths score rose from 4 (director death year) to 7 (three years after the death 
event) and to 11 (four years after the death event). However, this improvement was almost exclusively from 
changes in the employee relations and work force diversity categories of CSR, with the outgroup-oriented 
categories of CSR rising much less acutely. We think these results provide additional preliminary support 
for the idea that trauma-driven prosociality is directed especially toward ingroups.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study explored the question of how mortality salience influences prosocial behavior, in the context of 
large, for-profit firms and their leaders. In support of our hypotheses, we showed that CEO mortality 
salience, proxied by the death of a director at the same firm, was linked with subsequent changes in firm-
level corporate social responsibility, and that this relationship was stronger in situations where we would 
expect the death of a director to be especially salient. We also provided some supplementary evidence that 
CEOs’ increased prosociality was also manifested in other relevant professional domains, and that CEOs’ 
increased prosociality appears to be directed more toward ingroups than outgroups. 
Notably, our study shows that deaths of this kind tend to have a widespread organizational impact, 
which does not seem to be driven by the loss of knowledge, skills, or monitoring capabilities associated 
with the departure of a single member of a larger board of directors, but instead by the effect that such 
deaths have on those remaining at the firm. In contrast, most of the existing executive succession literature 
tends to take a direct, instrumental perspective, in that the departure of an effective senior leader is 
associated with negative consequences for the firm because of the loss of a certain set of skills and abilities 
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(e.g., Miller 1993, Shen and Cannella 2002, Huson et al. 2004), or that the departure of an ineffective leader 
provides substantive and/or symbolic benefits for a firm (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al. 2006). Our results show, 
however, that certain types of succession events may have an indirect effect because of how the 
characteristics of the succession impact those remaining at the firm.  
A limitation of our study is that we were unable to use a sample entirely comprised of sudden or 
fully unexpected deaths (cf. Shi et al. 2017). Our desire to ensure the most stringent possible matching 
between firms experiencing a director death and comparable firms that did not experience a death 
significantly reduced our available sample, and, by extension, the number of sudden deaths in our sample. 
This remains a limitation of our work because it is theoretically possible that some of the factors coincident 
with the eventual death of a director who does not die suddenly may also be linked with some of the changes 
in firm-level prosocial behavior. However, on balance, we think this is unlikely to have spuriously generated 
our results. First, we found that our core results were amplified by death suddenness, suggesting that the 
underlying causal mechanisms we propose were strongest in those situations where death was unexpected. 
Second, related recent work (Quigley et al. 2017) reinforces the notion that non-sudden deaths are likely to 
have an impact of firm-level outcomes, but a more muted one, suggesting that our study may actually offer 
a more conservative test of our core hypothesis. Third, the additional support we provide for the parallel 
trend assumption suggests that treatment firms in general (the majority of which experienced non-sudden 
deaths) did not appear to be changing their behavior in meaningful ways prior to the death events. 
One natural extension of our work would be to examine the implications of exogenous, unexpected 
experiences such as CEO peer deaths within other, more specific, strategic domains, such as new market 
entry, corporate restructuring, or organizational innovation. Salient changes in CEOs’ work and non-work 
priorities are likely to influence the characteristics of strategic decisions more generally. In addition, 
although the focus of our study is the CEO, we recognize that director deaths might also have an impact on 
other employees of the firm, notably those members of the firm’s TMT who are also inside directors. Work 
in this area could examine the influence of director deaths (and perhaps the unexpected deaths of senior 
leaders more generally) on the activities and perspectives of employees at levels below that of the CEO. 
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Another opportunity for future work concerns the personal and organizational factors that might 
inhibit or enhance these phenomena. Might certain executives be more impervious, or more susceptible, to 
these types of events, whether because of firm-level routines, contextual imperatives, dispositional factors, 
or (other) experiences? For instance, industries characterized by cutthroat product-market competition, or 
firms where internal and external governance pressures are substantial, might limit the opportunity for 
CEOs to enact their changed priorities (cf. Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987, Wangrow et al. 2015). In these 
situations, we might even expect to see an increased likelihood of voluntary departure in the short term.  
The results of our study have theoretical implications for several streams of management research, 
each of which open avenues for future work. First, we contribute to agency theory. Our study provides 
evidence of a situation where a change in CEO priorities and motivations can override the influence of 
standard governance mechanisms, such as financial incentives and monitoring (Beatty and Zajac 1994). 
Research into an executive’s pursuit of a quiet life (e.g., Rhoades and Rutz 1982, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2003) has shown that, when external pressures decrease, an agency conflict may arise as firms are more 
likely to act in ways consistent with CEO disengagement or withdrawal (Shi et al. 2017). We show that a 
change in CEO priorities may also result in an increase in engagement, but one that is directed toward a 
specific domain – investments in CSR initiatives. Although there exists considerable debate regarding the 
underlying causal relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm performance (e.g., Choi and 
Wang 2009, Kang et al. 2016, Lins et al. 2017), the decision to increase CSR by CEOs in our sample seems 
to have been taken entirely independent of its performance implications. Our results therefore suggest a 
different type of potential agency conflict, in that CEOs could be said to be ‘consuming’ CSR as an 
unmonitored perquisite (cf. Chin et al. 2013) as a result of unexpected changes in their personal preferences. 
Next, our work also has implications for research on CEO tenure. Some of this literature examines 
how the pattern of leaders’ actions and attitudes unfolds over the course of their careers (e.g., Miller and 
Shamsie 2001, Giambatista 2004, Henderson et al. 2006). Grounded in concepts such as the “seasons of a 
CEO’s tenure” (Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991), this work suggests that there are distinct, intrinsic temporal 
stages to leadership. Our study illustrates one way that the underlying rhythm of these stages might be 
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disturbed (cf. Meyer 1982), and identifies some of the implications that such a disturbance can have for 
both CEO-level and firm-level outcomes. 
Finally, our study also has implications for research in strategic leadership more generally, which 
assumes that executives’ fields of vision, perceptions, and interpretations are influenced by their underlying 
cognitions and values (Hambrick and Mason 1984). In response to criticism of the use of demographic 
proxies to reflect these individual differences (Pettigrew 1992, Carpenter et al. 2004), more recent work has 
employed a range of creative methodologies to more directly measure executive dispositions (e.g., 
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, Resick et al. 2009, Petrenko et al. 2016) and values (e.g., Agle et al. 1999, 
Briscoe et al. 2014). Many of these studies adopt the reasonable premise that most individual differences 
have trait-like, rather than state-like, properties, in that their influences will be largely consistent over an 
executive’s career. At the same time, though, an individual’s context and circumstances can influence 
behavior separate from their underlying traits, values, and preferences (Ross and Nisbett 1991, Fiske 2014). 
Our study provides one example of how this might occur in the executive suite.  
 In this way, our work echoes the conclusions of a number of recent studies identifying the impact 
that powerful personal experiences can have on work-related behaviors. For instance, the birth of a child to 
a male CEO influences both CEO and employee compensation (Dahl et al. 2012), while the characteristics 
of a male CEO’s marriage (traditional vs. non-traditional) influences their attitudes toward women in the 
workplace (Desai et al. 2014). Future work could explore how other types of external shocks – both negative 
(e.g., an accident) and positive (e.g., awards or personal recognition in a non-work sphere) could spark an 
internal change in CEOs’ outlooks and priorities. Studies such as these hold the promise of further 
integration of the influence of experiences and other individual differences in shaping executive behavior. 
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Table 1: Quality of CEM Matching 
The final CEM matched sample consists of 89 unique death events. All variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. 
Panel A Univariate and Multivariate L1 Statistics 
 
Before 
CEM 
After 
CEM  
Univariate L1 Statistics    
Firm Size 0.104 0.083  
ROA 0.170 0.104  
CEO age 0.228 0.094  
Board size 0.070 0.021  
Director age 0.236 0.073  
    
Multivariate L1 Statistics 0.999 0.813  
    
Panel B t-test difference in mean for CEM matched sample 
 Treated Control P-value 
Firm Size 7.190 7.224 0.858 
ROA 0.142 0.137 0.664 
CEO age 65.365 65.375 0.989 
Board size 9.688 9.667 0.955 
Director age 54.725 54.691 0.948 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Univariate Comparisons for All Variables 
The final CEM matched sample consists of 89 unique death events. All variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. Panel A shows the summary statistics for 
the main variables and Panel B provides univariate comparisons between treatment and control groups. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics     
  N Mean Median Std Min Max     
CSR 1254 0.649 0.000 1.285 0.000 11.000     
Leverage 1254 0.202 0.174 0.188 0.000 0.951     
Firm age 1254 3.050 3.045 0.709 0.693 4.357     
Diversification 1254 1.441 1.000 1.199 0.000 5.000     
Board independence 1254 0.794 0.833 0.114 0.250 1.000     
CEO duality 1254 0.625 1.000 0.484 0.000 1.000     
CEO tenure 1254 16.753 15.000 10.607 0.000 44.000     
CEO turnover 1254 0.055 0.000 0.228 0.000 1.000     
Director leave % 1254 0.055 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.417     
Director join % 1254 0.075 0.000 0.116 0.000 1.000     
           
           
Panel B: Univariate Comparisons 
  Treated Firms   Control Firms       
 Before After P-value  Before After P-value  DID P-value 
CSR 0.556 1.006 0.000  0.467 0.555 0.240  0.363 0.011 
Leverage 0.220 0.187 0.030  0.207 0.193 0.332  -0.020 0.353 
Firm age 3.028 3.161 0.020  2.908 3.096 0.001  -0.055 0.491 
Diversification 1.487 1.474 0.886  1.444 1.361 0.398  0.070 0.607 
Board independence 0.790 0.791 0.853  0.796 0.799 0.794  -0.001 0.939 
CEO duality 0.667 0.639 0.462  0.637 0.561 0.051  0.048 0.375 
CEO tenure 16.170 16.944 0.334  16.922 16.956 0.969  0.739 0.538 
CEO turnover 0.052 0.069 0.395  0.056 0.044 0.491  0.028 0.274 
Director leave % 0.054 0.063 0.181  0.054 0.049 0.411  0.014 0.123 
Director join % 0.079 0.074 0.579   0.090 0.059 0.002   0.026 0.045 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: Baseline DID Models 
The final CEM matched sample consists of 89 unique death events. All variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. 
Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. In column (1) to (5), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
are clustered at the firm level. In Column (6), we bootstrapped standard errors by firm with 10,000 iterations. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR 
              
Post-death*Death group 0.335*** 0.372*** 0.427*** 0.358** 0.382*** 0.372*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.07) 
Post-death -0.188** -0.203** -0.205** -0.143 -0.231** -0.203*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) 
Leverage  0.453 0.717** 0.382 -0.865** 0.453** 
  (0.29) (0.34) (0.48) (0.34) (0.22) 
Firm age  0.374 0.495 0.279 0.166 0.374** 
  (0.36) (0.41) (0.49) (0.13) (0.19) 
Diversification  0.015 0.015 0.075 -0.113* 0.015 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Board independence  -0.895 -0.619 -0.045 -0.940 -0.895** 
  (0.66) (0.84) (0.68) (0.62) (0.42) 
CEO duality  0.092 0.025 0.117 0.114 0.092 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) 
CEO tenure  -0.005 -0.011 0.001 -0.015** -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO turnover  -0.150 -0.214* 0.038 -0.109 -0.150* 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) 
Director leave %  -0.102 -0.090 0.276 0.161 -0.102 
  (0.20) (0.23) (0.31) (0.24) (0.25) 
Director join %  -0.487*** -0.461** -0.640** -0.507*** -0.487*** 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.28) (0.19) (0.16) 
Death group     0.057  
     (0.09)  
              
Observations 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 
R-squared 0.7752 0.7809 0.8206 0.8821 0.5660 0.7809 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
CEO FE No No Yes No No No 
Industry*year FE No No No Yes No No 
Matched Pair FE No No No No Yes No 
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Table 4: Moderating Analyses 
The final CEM matched sample consists of 89 unique death events. All variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. 
Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the 
firm level.  
 
Panel A Relational Connection Panel B Sudden Death 
  (1)   (2) 
 CSR  CSR 
        
Post-death*Death group 0.55 Post-death*Death group 0.294** 
 (1.60)  (2.44) 
Post-death*Death group*CEO Appointee 1.008*** Post-death*Death group*Sudden 0.564** 
 (2.79)  (2.07) 
Post-death -0.256*** Post-death -0.203** 
 (-2.69)  (-2.45) 
Leverage 0.683* Leverage 0.397 
 (1.93)  (1.41) 
Firm Age 0.296 Firm Age 0.363 
 (0.74)  (1.09) 
Diversification 0.034 Diversification 0.012 
 (0.60)  (0.25) 
Board Independence -0.648 Board Independence -0.900 
 (-0.83)  (-1.36) 
CEO Duality 0.173* CEO Duality 0.103 
 (1.66)  (1.27) 
CEO tenure -0.003 CEO tenure -0.005 
 (-0.32)  (-0.53) 
CEO turnover -0.207 CEO turnover -0.161 
 (-1.54)  (-1.50) 
Director leave % -0.036 Director leave % -0.085 
 (-0.16)  (-0.41) 
Director join % -0.636*** Director join % -0.488*** 
 (-3.13)  (-2.83) 
    
Observations 1,064 Observations 1,254 
R-squared 0.7792 R-squared 0.7834 
Firm FE Yes Firm FE Yes 
Year FE Yes Year FE Yes 
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Table 5: Alternative Specifications 
This table considers alternative matching techniques. All variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. Standard 
errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance levels 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. In Column (1), we report bootstrapped standard errors. In column (2) to (4), standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the firm level.  
 
  Poisson 
1:1 with 
Replacement 
1:n without 
Replacement 
Alternative 
CEM Matching 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSR CSR CSR CSR 
         
Post-death*Death group 0.399** 0.339*** 0.324** 0.226* 
 (2.29) (2.67) (2.58) (1.67) 
Post-death -0.242* -0.275*** -0.200** -0.172* 
 (-1.65) (-2.76) (-2.40) (-1.94) 
Leverage -0.110 0.354 0.229 0.029 
 (-0.14) (1.05) (0.81) (0.07) 
Firm age 0.945** 0.222 -0.010 -1.132* 
 (2.18) (0.61) (-0.03) (-1.87) 
Diversification 0.047 0.046 -0.075 0.008 
 (0.74) (0.87) (-1.16) (0.13) 
Board independence -0.878 -0.195 -0.031 -2.008*** 
 (-0.84) (-0.29) (-0.06) (-2.83) 
CEO duality 0.361** -0.019 0.003 -0.151 
 (2.18) (-0.18) (0.03) (-1.29) 
CEO tenure -0.002 0.005 0.000 -0.015 
 (-0.08) (0.54) (0.01) (-1.62) 
CEO turnover -0.222** -0.005 0.045 0.093 
 (-2.42) (-0.05) (0.45) (0.62) 
Director leave % -0.044 -0.285 -0.327 -1.165*** 
 (-0.08) (-1.16) (-1.27) (-2.88) 
Director join % -1.266*** -0.604*** -0.628*** -0.812*** 
 (-3.39) (-3.28) (-3.91) (-2.86) 
Board size    0.112*** 
    (2.69) 
Director age    0.023 
    (1.47) 
     
Observations 1,254 1,544 1,723 2,810 
R-squared - 0.7371 0.7920 0.8428 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Alternative Dependent Variables 
The final CEM matched sample consists of 89 unique death events. CSR outside was operationalized as the mean 
firm-year-level CSR score at firms where the CEO served as an outside director. Nonprofit boards was operationalized 
as the number of nonprofit board directorships (e.g., charities, schools, and religious organizations) associated with a 
particular CEO in a given year in the BoardEx database. All other variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. 
Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Coefficients for the control variables were omitted from the table. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CSR 
Outside 
Nonprofit 
Boards 
CSR 
Outside 
Nonprofit 
Boards 
          
Post-death*Death group 0.212*** 0.081*** 0.187*** 0.067*** 
 (2.73) (2.67) (2.70) (2.61) 
Post-death -0.080 -0.056* -0.053 -0.047* 
 (-1.37) (-1.91) (-0.97) (-1.84) 
     
Observations 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 
R-squared 0.7351 0.4557 0.7443 0.4754 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 7: Ingroup CSR vs. Outgroup CSR 
The final CEM matched sample consists of 89 unique death events. CSR-Ingroup is the CSR strengths count for the 
following three ingroup-focused dimensions: employee relations, diversity, and product quality.  CSR-Outgroup is the 
CSR strengths count for the following three outgroup-focused dimensions: community relations, human rights, and 
the environment. All other variables are defined in Section 3 of the paper. Standard errors are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Coefficients for the control variables were omitted from the table. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 CSR-Outgroup CSR-Ingroup 
      
Post-death*Death group 0.074 0.235** 
 (0.05) (0.09) 
Post-death -0.051 -0.127* 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.07) 
    
Observations 1,254 1,254 
R-squared 0.5938 0.7692 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Test of difference in coefficient on Post*Death across two subsample 
Chi2  3.38 
p-value   0.066 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Corporate Social Responsibility Strengths Scores Pre- and Post-Death 
Figure 1 displays histograms for CSR for the treatment and control firms both before and after the death event. 
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Figure 2: Difference-in-differences Analysis: Parallel Trend Graphs 
This figure depicts the average value of CSR across treated and control firms from t-3 to t+3 where t=0 is the year where death occurred. The figure includes whisker plots of 90% 
confidence intervals for the treated and control groups. In the table beneath the figure, we report yearly mean differences between treated and control groups. 
      
T-test difference in mean between treatment and control firms 
Event year t-3 t-2 t-1 t=death year t+1 t+2 t+3 
t-stat 0.943 -0.746 -0.559 -1.683 -1.691 -1.627 -4.415 
p-value 0.347 0.457 0.577 0.094 0.093 0.106 0.000 
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